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Abstract	  Despite	  overlapping	  explanatory	  theories	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  terrorism	  and	  civil	  conflict,	  these	  two	  phenomena	  have	  largely	  been	  studied	  in	  isolation.	  This	  study	  addresses	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  conflict	  literature	  by	  investigating	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization’s	  base	  of	  operations.	  It	  is	  postulated	  that	  weak	  state	  capacity	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  organize	  while	  civil	  conflict	  increases	  this	  opportunity	  via	  the	  transmission	  of	  information	  on	  and	  the	  reduction	  in	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  prevent	  organization	  formation.	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  then	  tested	  by	  estimating	  a	  logistic	  regression	  analysis	  for	  the	  years	  1980-­‐2004	  through	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  START	  information	  on	  Terrorist	  Organization	  Profiles.	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  state	  capacity	  exerts	  an	  increasingly	  positive	  influence	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization,	  while	  civil	  conflict	  only	  exerts	  a	  positive	  influence	  at	  higher	  intensities.	  Additionally,	  political	  freedom	  and	  ethnolinguistic	  fractionalization	  have	  a	  negative	  impact,	  while	  the	  contiguity	  of	  the	  target	  state	  to	  the	  state	  in	  which	  the	  organization	  is	  based	  exerts	  a	  positive	  and	  robust	  influence.	  These	  results	  suggest	  the	  need	  for	  both	  the	  opportunity	  to	  organize	  and	  the	  willingness	  to	  provide	  cover	  or	  recruits	  for	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  to	  form	  and	  operate.	  	  	  	  	  
	   1	  
Introduction	  	   Terrorism	  and	  civil	  conflict	  are	  recognized	  as	  two	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  threats	  to	  state	  security	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  The	  ability	  to	  organize	  domestically	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  state	  or	  in	  one	  state	  in	  order	  to	  launch	  an	  attack	  in	  another,	  sometimes	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away,	  have	  been	  recurring	  characteristics	  of	  weak,	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  Consequently,	  much	  attention	  has	  been	  given	  to	  the	  conditions	  that	  provide	  the	  motivation	  and	  opportunity	  for	  both	  terrorism	  and	  rebellion	  to	  occur.	  Although	  terrorist	  groups	  differ	  from	  rebel	  groups	  in	  terms	  of	  organization	  and	  objectives,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  observe	  the	  two	  occurring	  separately,	  yet	  simultaneously,	  such	  as	  the	  Taliban	  in	  Afghanistan	  or	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  in	  Sudan.	  It	  is	  therefore	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  structural	  conditions	  found	  to	  be	  conducive	  to	  rebellion,	  such	  as	  socioeconomic,	  political,	  and	  demographic	  factors,	  are	  often	  similar	  or	  identical	  to	  the	  conditions	  that	  facilitate	  terrorist	  participation	  and	  activity.	  Despite	  this	  seemingly	  blatant	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  phenomena,	  they	  have	  largely	  been	  studied	  in	  isolation	  from	  one	  another.	  Likewise,	  the	  research	  on	  terrorism	  has	  neglected	  investigation	  into	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  individual	  participation	  and	  terrorist	  activity.	  	   This	  study	  addresses	  these	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  by	  positing	  a	  state	  capacity	  perspective	  for	  understanding	  the	  presence	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations’	  base	  of	  operations.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations,	  or	  those	  organizations	  that	  are	  based	  in	  a	  state	  that	  does	  not	  contain	  the	  target	  of	  their	  attacks,	  locate	  their	  base	  of	  operations	  as	  a	  function	  of	  that	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  limit	  their	  operations.	  Weak	  states	  allow	  terrorist	  organizations	  to	  operate	  without	  the	  risk	  of	  state	  interference	  thereby	  lowering	  the	  costs	  of	  organization	  through	  permitting	  the	  divergence	  of	  funds	  normally	  used	  for	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state	  evasion	  towards	  other	  operational	  costs	  (Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  2002).	  They	  can	  additionally	  provide	  a	  political	  vacuum	  for	  terrorists	  to	  fill	  and	  provide	  a	  protective	  veneer	  of	  sovereignty	  from	  third	  party	  intervention	  (Piazza	  2008).	  It	  is	  furthermore	  stipulated	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  contributes	  to	  terrorist	  organizations’	  location	  through	  the	  transmission	  of	  information	  on	  and	  the	  further	  reduction	  in	  state	  capacity	  (Thies	  2010).	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  civil	  conflict	  signals	  the	  inability	  of	  a	  state	  to	  deter	  or	  prevent	  rebel	  organization	  formation	  (Ginkel	  and	  Smith	  1999)	  and,	  thus,	  their	  increased	  inability	  to	  prevent	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  due	  to	  weakened	  state	  capacity.	  	  	   There	  has	  been	  limited	  research	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  terrorist	  organizations	  and	  state	  capacity,	  the	  majority	  of	  which	  has	  concentrated	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  on	  terrorists’	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  attacks.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  ability,	  we	  must	  first	  analyze	  the	  conditions	  that	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  initial	  formation	  of	  the	  terrorist	  organization.	  This	  is	  accomplished	  by	  investigating	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  on	  the	  actual	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  and,	  subsequently,	  the	  specific	  ability	  to	  organize,	  recruit,	  raise	  funds,	  and	  train	  in	  one	  location	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  attack	  in	  another.	  I	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  insurgent	  and	  terrorist	  groups.	  	   The	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  provide	  support	  for	  my	  main	  argument	  that	  the	  willingness-­‐opportunity	  perspective	  which	  has	  been	  rigorously	  explored	  in	  the	  conflict	  literature	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  1998,	  2004;	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  2003;	  Most	  and	  Starr	  1989;	  Starr	  1978;	  Vasquez	  1993)	  is	  also	  applicable	  to	  terrorist	  organization	  formation.	  Both	  the	  opportunity	  for	  organization,	  fund	  raising,	  and	  training,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  willingness	  to	  harbor	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or	  be	  recruited	  into	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  are	  crucial	  influencers	  on	  the	  location	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations.	  The	  effects	  of	  opportunity	  are	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  the	  contiguity	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  an	  organization	  is	  based	  to	  the	  state	  in	  which	  they	  conduct	  attacks	  as	  well	  as	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  civil	  conflict.	  The	  latter	  represents	  the	  opportunity	  for	  organization	  formation	  created	  by	  the	  protection	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  while	  the	  former	  indicates	  a	  potential	  exploitation	  of	  the	  chaos	  and	  divergence	  of	  state	  resources	  towards	  the	  civil	  conflict.	  However,	  this	  relationship	  only	  applies	  with	  the	  Correlates	  of	  War	  (COW)	  higher	  threshold	  of	  civil	  conflict.	  The	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  (UCDP)	  definition	  of	  civil	  conflict	  is	  insignificant.	  	  	   The	  consequences	  of	  willingness	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  population	  willing	  to	  act	  as	  a	  pool	  of	  recruits	  or	  to	  harbor	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  are	  seen	  in	  the	  highly	  significant	  and	  negative	  effects	  of	  political	  freedom	  and	  ethnolinguistic	  fractionalization	  across	  all	  models.	  A	  deficit	  of	  political	  freedom	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  divisions	  create	  grievances	  throughout	  the	  population	  which	  terrorists	  can	  exploit	  in	  order	  to	  radicalize	  individuals	  to	  join	  their	  cause	  or	  provide	  cover	  from	  state	  authorities.	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  state	  capacity	  was	  found	  to	  have	  consistent,	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  This	  result	  indicates	  that	  state	  capacity	  is	  not	  operating	  through	  the	  opportunity	  mechanism	  as	  originally	  hypothesized	  but,	  instead,	  exerts	  a	  divergent	  relationship	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  	  	   Without	  furthering	  testing,	  only	  speculation	  as	  to	  the	  reasons	  behind	  this	  positive	  effect	  is	  possible.	  It	  is	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  state	  with	  high	  extractive	  capacity	  creates	  grievances	  to	  be	  exploited	  or	  that	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  do	  not	  require	  the	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opportunity	  presented	  by	  weak	  state	  institutions	  due	  to	  the	  already	  obtained	  opportunity	  through	  contiguity	  and	  civil	  conflict.	  However,	  an	  interaction	  term	  between	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict	  reveals	  that	  state	  capacity	  exerts	  a	  greater	  positive	  effect	  when	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  than	  when	  there	  is	  not.	  This	  provides	  relatively	  weak	  evidence	  for	  two	  possibilities:	  1)	  that	  a	  state	  with	  strong	  extractive	  capacity	  has	  a	  grievance-­‐ridden	  population	  to	  exploit	  or	  2)	  that,	  despite	  capable	  state	  institutions,	  civil	  conflict	  creates	  opportunity	  through	  the	  divergence	  of	  state	  resources	  from	  general	  population	  surveillance	  towards	  the	  direct,	  internal	  threat.	  	   Despite	  the	  ambiguous	  results	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity,	  the	  analysis	  ultimately	  reveals	  the	  influence	  of	  both	  the	  opportunity	  and	  willingness	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  They	  point	  to	  the	  need	  for	  additional	  investigation	  into	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  terrorist	  organizations,	  particularly	  those	  who	  operate	  across	  state	  borders.	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Theoretical	  Overlap	  &	  Empirical	  Isolation	  	   The	  objective	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  highlight	  and	  address	  three,	  relevant	  puzzles	  and	  gaps	  in	  the	  conflict	  literature	  stemming	  from	  the	  theoretical	  overlap	  on	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  rebellion	  and	  terrorism	  and,	  yet,	  their	  investigative	  isolation	  in	  the	  literature.	  Despite	  the	  obvious	  similarities	  and	  connections	  between	  the	  two	  phenomena,	  they	  have	  largely	  been	  studied	  separately	  in	  the	  conflict	  literature.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  significant,	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  gaps	  in	  the	  research	  on	  terrorism.	  The	  first	  of	  which	  pertains	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  investigation	  into	  the	  influence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  on	  terrorism.	  Although	  Sambanis	  (2008)	  explicitly	  argues	  that,	  “both	  international	  and	  domestic	  terrorism	  can	  grow	  out	  of	  a	  civil	  war	  or	  lead	  to	  it,	  ”(p.	  174),	  he	  investigates	  the	  influence	  of	  terrorist	  events	  on	  the	  occurrence	  of	  civil	  war,	  leaving	  open	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  influence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  on	  the	  opportunity	  for	  terrorists	  to	  organize	  within	  a	  state	  that	  they	  are	  not	  targeting.	  	  	   There	  is	  also	  a	  deficiency	  of	  research	  on	  the	  conditions	  that	  enable	  or	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  and	  willingness	  for	  a	  terrorist	  group	  to	  organize.	  The	  studies	  that	  do	  stem	  from	  a	  willingness-­‐opportunity	  perspective	  (Ehrlich	  and	  Liu	  2002;	  Newman	  2007;	  Piazza	  2008;	  Sambanis	  2008)	  have	  rarely	  done	  so	  explicitly	  and	  have	  concentrated	  on	  individual	  participation	  or	  terrorist	  activities	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  organization	  formation.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  despite	  its	  prevalence	  in	  the	  research	  on	  rebel	  organizations,	  there	  is	  a	  scarcity	  of	  research	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  terrorist	  organizations	  to	  organize,	  raise	  funds,	  train,	  and	  recruit.	  The	  studies	  that	  have	  investigated	  terrorist	  organizations	  take	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  organization	  as	  a	  priori	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  effect	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of	  internal	  organizational	  dynamics	  on	  group	  behavior	  (see	  Crenshaw	  1988	  and	  McCormick	  2003	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  these	  studies).	  	   The	  last	  two	  of	  these	  puzzles	  in	  the	  literature	  seemingly	  stem	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  codified	  data	  on	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  terrorist	  organizations.	  The	  scattering	  of	  studies	  that	  have	  postulated	  an	  opportunity	  argument	  by	  looking	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  failed,	  failing,	  or	  weak	  states	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  terrorist	  groups	  to	  organize	  failed	  to	  test	  their	  hypotheses	  (Gunaratna	  2002;	  Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  2002),	  looked	  instead	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  individual	  terrorists	  (Ehrlich	  and	  Liu	  2002;	  Piazza	  2008)	  or	  terrorist	  incidents	  (Sambanis	  2008).	  This	  study	  addresses	  these	  gaps	  by	  looking	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  both	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict	  on	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  to	  organize	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conditions	  that	  create	  a	  population	  willing	  to	  harbor	  or	  be	  recruited	  into	  a	  terrorist	  organization.	  Their	  effects	  are	  then	  tested	  in	  a	  more	  precise	  manner	  than	  previously	  accomplished	  through	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  National	  Consortium	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Terrorism	  and	  Responses	  to	  Terrorism	  (START)	  information	  on	  Terrorist	  Organization	  Profiles	  (TOPs).1	  	  	   Both	  terrorism	  and	  civil	  conflict	  represent	  distinct,	  yet	  overlapping,	  forms	  of	  political	  violence	  or	  what	  Tarrow	  (2011)	  designates	  “contentious	  politics”.	  Terrorism	  is	  a	  method	  of	  violence	  used	  on	  civilians	  by	  small,	  decentralized	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  radically	  influence	  political	  policy	  (Crenshaw	  1990),	  while	  civil	  conflict	  evolves	  from	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  the	  state	  for	  a	  range	  of	  political	  ends	  from	  ethnic	  autonomy	  to	  secession.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  lies	  in	  their	  objectives	  and	  targets,	  although	  the	  distinction	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  (Berman	  and	  Laitin	  2005).	  Rebel	  groups	  often	  use	  terrorism	  as	  a	  tactic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/	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in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  conflict,	  but	  few	  terrorists	  groups	  evolve	  into	  rebel	  organizations	  (Kalyvas	  2004).	  This	  inherent	  overlap	  between	  the	  two	  explains	  their	  separation	  in	  the	  literature	  although	  scholars	  have	  investigated	  the	  causes	  of	  both	  using	  similar	  perspectives:	  psychological	  and	  rational	  choice.	  	  	   The	  frustration-­‐aggression	  model	  put	  forth	  by	  Davies	  (1962)	  has	  been	  used	  to	  explain	  both	  terrorism	  and	  civil	  conflict.	  Extrapolated	  by	  Gurr	  (1970),	  Davies’	  (1962)	  J-­‐curve	  theory	  proposes	  that	  political	  violence	  emerges	  as	  a	  function	  of	  frustration	  due	  to	  a	  gap	  between	  desired	  and	  perceived,	  future	  economic	  and	  social	  gains.	  The	  gap	  occurs	  when	  a	  period	  of	  prolonged	  economic	  growth	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  sharp	  and	  sudden	  reversal.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  gap	  between	  desired	  and	  perceived	  expectations	  that	  grievances	  are	  created	  and	  provide	  the	  motivation	  for	  political	  violence.	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  (1998,	  2002)	  are	  the	  most	  well	  known	  proponents	  of	  this	  understanding	  of	  grievances	  as	  motivation	  for	  participation	  in	  rebellion.	  They	  cite	  economic	  inequalities	  and	  ethnic/religious	  divisions	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  grievances	  as	  motivating	  factors.	  Grievances	  are	  also	  explored	  as	  functions	  of	  inequalities	  produced	  by	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  (Davies	  1962;	  Gotchev	  2006;	  Gurr	  1970;	  Newman	  2006,	  2007),	  demographic	  (Ehrlich	  and	  Liu	  2002;	  Ross	  1993;	  Simon	  2003)	  [produced	  by	  urbanization	  (Brennan-­‐Galvin	  2002;	  Massey	  1996;	  Ross	  1993)],	  and	  political	  conditions	  of	  a	  state	  (Goldstone	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Gunaratna	  2002;	  Hegre	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Krueger	  and	  Laitin	  2007).	  	   The	  grievance	  model	  has	  been	  explicitly	  applied	  to	  the	  study	  of	  terrorism	  (Feierabend	  and	  Feierabend	  1966,	  1972;	  Feierabend	  et	  al.	  1969;	  Gurney	  and	  Tierney	  1982;	  Margolin	  1977),	  but	  has	  also	  been	  implicitly	  investigated	  through	  research	  on	  the	  influence	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of	  poverty	  and	  political	  oppression	  (Abadie	  2004,	  2006;	  Gunaratna	  2002;	  Krueger	  and	  Laitin	  2007).	  Krueger	  and	  Laitin	  (2007)	  find	  that	  the	  sources	  of	  terrorism	  are	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  political	  repression	  rather	  than	  economic	  variables.	  Likewise,	  Abadie	  (2004,	  2006)	  empirically	  investigates	  this	  relationship	  but	  finds	  a	  non-­‐monotonic	  relationship	  between	  political	  rights	  and	  the	  country	  level	  risk	  of	  a	  terrorist	  attack.	  	  	   While	  the	  civil	  conflict	  literature	  looks	  to	  the	  psychological	  effects	  on	  the	  collective	  population	  in	  terms	  of	  producing	  the	  motivation	  for	  rebellion,	  the	  terrorism	  literature	  has	  largely	  applied	  the	  psychological	  perspective	  towards	  explaining	  individual	  participation	  in	  terrorist	  activities.	  The	  Narcissistic-­‐Rage	  hypothesis	  stipulates	  that	  individuals	  become	  terrorists	  out	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  power	  or	  control	  through	  intimidation	  (Crayton	  1983),	  for	  blatantly	  narcissistic	  reasons	  such	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  revolutionary	  heroism,	  self-­‐importance,	  borderline	  personality	  disorder	  (Post	  1990),	  or	  due	  to	  narcissistic	  injuries	  early	  in	  life	  (Shaw	  1986).	  Similarly,	  much	  attention	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  discovering	  the	  underlying	  psychological	  traits	  that	  terrorists	  share	  (Billig	  1985;	  Clarke	  1982;	  Gutmann	  1979;	  Hubbard	  1975;	  Jenkins	  1982;	  Kaplan	  1978;	  Knutson	  1980,	  1981;	  Oots	  and	  Weigele	  1985;	  Russell	  and	  Miller	  1983).	  Some	  posit	  that	  terrorism	  is	  a	  form	  a	  mental	  illness	  since	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  explanation	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  commit	  suicide	  for	  a	  cause	  whose	  benefits	  they	  will	  not	  be	  alive	  to	  receive	  (McCauley	  and	  Sefal	  1987).	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  Narcissism-­‐Aggression	  model	  is	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  individual	  terrorists	  as	  the	  function	  of	  internal,	  psychological	  processes	  (Crayton	  1983;	  Haynal	  et	  al.	  1983;	  Lasch	  1979;	  Morf	  1970;	  Pearlstein	  1991;	  Post	  1984,	  1986,	  1990).	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   This	  notion	  that	  the	  use	  of	  terrorism	  stems	  from	  individual,	  psychological	  processes	  has	  been	  rigorously	  disputed	  (Corrado	  1981;	  Ferracuti	  1990;	  Ferracuti	  and	  Brunco	  1981;	  Heskin	  1980,	  1984;	  Hoffman	  1998;	  McCauley	  and	  Segal	  1987;	  Rasch	  1979;	  Reich	  1990b;	  Silke	  1998)	  and	  countered	  with	  rational-­‐choice	  explanations.	  The	  rational-­‐choice	  viewpoint	  focuses	  on	  the	  conditions	  that	  influence	  the	  opportunity,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  motivation,	  for	  terrorism	  to	  occur.	  It	  models	  terrorists	  as	  rational	  actors	  who	  choose	  the	  use	  of	  this	  specific	  form	  of	  political	  violence	  when	  the	  benefits	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  or	  when	  other	  options	  are	  not	  available	  or	  have	  been	  exhausted.	  Many	  studies	  in	  the	  terrorism	  literature	  explicitly	  argue	  for	  this	  perspective	  by	  presenting	  the	  use	  of	  terrorism	  as	  a	  strategic,	  rational	  choice	  despite	  the	  free-­‐rider	  problem	  (Olson	  1965)	  that	  the	  psychological	  perspective	  seeks	  to	  explain	  (Berman	  2003;	  Berman	  &	  Laitin	  2005;	  Hoffman	  and	  McCormick	  2004;	  Iannaccon	  2003;	  Pape	  2003;	  Sprinzak	  2000;	  Wintrobe	  2003).	  	  	   This	  perspective	  focuses	  on	  suicide	  terrorism	  in	  particular	  and	  cites	  the	  range	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  backgrounds	  of	  suicide	  terrorists	  as	  evidence	  against	  the	  psychological	  perspective	  (Kruger	  and	  Maleckova	  2002;	  Paz	  2000;	  Russell	  and	  Miller	  1983;	  Wintrobe	  2003)	  while	  arguing	  for	  the	  use	  of	  terrorism	  as	  a	  rational	  decision	  based	  on	  the	  strategic	  environment	  (Enders	  and	  Sandler	  1993,	  2006;	  Sandler,	  Tschirhart,	  and	  Cauley	  1983;	  Sandler	  and	  Lapan	  1988,	  1993).	  Terrorism	  is	  a	  strategic	  choice	  made	  in	  a	  constrained	  environment	  (Braungart	  and	  Braungart	  1992;	  Crenshaw	  1981;	  Gurr	  1990;	  Ross	  1993).	  Terrorists	  are	  ultimately	  weak	  actors	  who	  use	  the	  only	  tools	  available	  to	  them	  based	  on	  enabling	  factors	  that	  create	  tactical	  opportunity	  (Crenshaw	  1981).	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   The	  psychological	  perspective	  of	  terrorism	  has	  managed	  to	  rationalize	  these	  two	  viewpoints	  by	  arguing	  for	  terrorism	  as	  both	  a	  product	  of	  psychological	  processes	  and	  a	  strategy	  with	  psychological	  aims	  such	  that,	  “…	  political	  terrorism,	  is,	  at	  base,	  a	  particularly	  vicious	  species	  of	  psychological	  warfare,”	  (Post	  1990,	  39-­‐40).	  Caplan	  (2000,	  2001,	  2006)	  similarly	  proposes	  a	  model	  of	  rational	  irrationally	  wherein	  the	  benefits	  of	  suicide	  terrorism	  are	  material	  as	  well	  as	  psychological	  due	  to	  the	  irrational	  preferences	  produced	  by	  extreme	  religious	  or	  ideological	  beliefs.	  Still	  others	  continue	  to	  argue	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  suicide	  terrorism	  as	  a	  rational	  choice	  due	  to	  the	  economic,	  social,	  or	  symbolic	  incentives	  provided	  to	  families	  and	  communities	  (Azam	  2005;	  Berman	  and	  Laitin	  2005;	  Iannaccone	  2003;	  Pape	  2003).	  Azam	  (2005)	  specifically	  models	  suicide	  terrorism	  as	  an	  inter-­‐generational	  investment.	  Although	  the	  individuals	  who	  perform	  the	  suicide	  bombing	  will	  not	  receive	  the	  benefits	  of	  their	  action,	  it	  is	  a	  rational	  choice	  based	  on	  the	  benefits	  that	  future	  generations	  of	  their	  family	  will	  receive.	  Hoffman	  and	  McCormick	  (2004)	  argue	  that	  terrorism	  is	  rational	  in	  that	  it	  signals	  a	  group’s	  willingness	  to	  kill	  and	  to	  be	  killed	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	  objectives.	  	  	   There	  exists	  a	  similar	  divide	  in	  the	  civil	  conflict	  literature	  between	  the	  arguments	  of	  rebellion	  as	  a	  function	  of	  grievances	  (Davies	  1962;	  Connor	  1994;	  Gurr	  1970;	  Paige	  1975)	  or	  as	  a	  strategic,	  rational	  choice	  when	  the	  benefits	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  (Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  2003;	  Moore	  1995;	  Muller	  and	  Opp	  1986).	  The	  latter	  perspective	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  those	  who	  focus	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  rebellion	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  research	  investigating	  the	  positive	  relationship	  between	  primary	  commodity	  exports,	  lootable	  natural	  resources	  and	  rebellion	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  1998,	  2004;	  Lujala,	  Gleditsch	  and	  Gilmore	  2005)	  and	  those	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who	  focus	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  rebellion	  in	  terms	  of	  state	  capacity	  (De	  Soysa	  and	  Neumayer	  2007;	  Fearon	  2005;	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  2003;	  Humphreys	  2005).	  Fearon	  (2005)	  counters	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler’s	  (1998)	  argument	  for	  a	  greedy,	  looting	  rebel	  understanding	  of	  rebellion,	  by	  contending	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  natural	  resources	  instead	  works	  through	  their	  influence	  of	  the	  capacity	  of	  state	  institutions.	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  inherent	  difficulty	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  two	  mechanisms.	  Although	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  (2003)	  argue	  for	  an	  opportunity	  or	  state	  capacity	  perspective,	  they	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  their	  proxy	  may,	  in	  fact,	  be	  acting	  as	  a	  motivator	  by	  making	  the	  state	  a	  greater	  prize	  for	  capture.	  	  	   Although	  the	  state	  capacity	  model	  has	  gained	  considerable	  traction	  in	  the	  civil	  conflict	  literature,	  both	  arguments	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  shaping	  the	  opportunity-­‐willingness	  structure	  within	  a	  state	  by	  altering	  both	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  for	  rebellion	  through	  changing	  incentives	  and	  resources	  (Tilly	  1978).	  Skocpol	  (1985)	  defines	  the	  state	  as	  an	  organization	  pursing	  collective	  goals	  more	  or	  less	  effectively	  given	  the	  available	  resources.	  However,	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  state	  to	  pursue	  these	  collective	  goals	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  but	  the	  ability	  of	  state	  institutions	  to	  effectively	  harness	  them.	  Some	  states	  are	  extremely	  capable	  of	  harnessing	  whatever	  resources	  are	  available;	  while	  others	  are	  extremely	  incapable	  of	  capturing	  potential	  resources,	  abundant	  or	  otherwise.	  States	  with	  limited	  capacity	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  either	  deter	  or	  resist	  internal	  dissent	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  goods	  and	  services	  or	  effective	  repression	  (Sobek	  2010).	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  highly	  capable	  state	  reduces	  the	  probability	  of	  success	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  potential	  costs	  and	  lowering	  the	  opportunity	  for	  rebellion	  (Lichbach	  1995;	  Taylor	  2003).	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   While	  the	  civil	  conflict	  literature	  has	  accentuated	  the	  importance	  of	  state	  capacity	  in	  terms	  of	  institutional	  extractive	  capacity,	  the	  terrorism	  literature	  has	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  conditions	  that	  provide	  permissive	  or	  enabling	  environments	  for	  terrorist	  organizations	  and	  activities	  such	  as	  geographic	  features,	  including	  rural	  and	  mountains	  areas	  (Abadie	  2006;	  Blomber,	  Gaibulloev,	  and	  Sandler	  2011;	  Ross	  1993),	  government	  corruption	  (Gunaratna	  2002),	  and	  lack	  of	  economic	  development	  (Gunaratna	  2002;	  Li	  and	  Schaub	  2004).	  The	  few	  who	  do	  focus	  directly	  on	  state	  capacity	  do	  so	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  failing	  or	  failed	  states	  (Ehrlich	  and	  Liu	  2002;	  Gunaratna	  2002;	  Newman	  2007;	  Piazza	  2008;	  Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  2002).	  	   Ultimately,	  the	  literature	  explaining	  the	  causes	  of	  terrorism	  and	  civil	  conflict	  stem	  from	  similar	  perspectives,	  posit	  similar	  theories,	  and	  cite	  similar	  evidence.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  conditions	  that	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  and	  willingness	  for	  both	  civil	  conflict	  and	  terrorism	  must	  be	  similar,	  the	  same,	  or	  interrelated,	  yet	  few	  have	  investigated	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  two.	  Gurr	  (1970)	  subsumes	  terrorism	  under	  a	  category	  of	  political	  violence	  deemed	  “conspiracy”	  and	  Hyams	  (1974)	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  little	  variation	  between	  the	  causes	  of	  guerilla	  warfare	  and	  terrorism,	  but	  the	  majority	  of	  scholars	  have	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  one	  form	  of	  political	  violence	  over	  another.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  inattention	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  conflict	  on	  the	  incidence	  of	  terrorism.	  The	  few	  scholars	  who	  have	  investigated	  the	  influence	  of	  conflict	  on	  terrorism	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  interstate	  war	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  being	  targeting	  by	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  (Chenoweth	  2009;	  Li	  and	  Schaub	  2004;	  Pape	  2005).	  The	  exception	  is	  Sambanis	  (2008),	  who	  argues	  that	  civil	  war	  can	  generate	  the	  conditions	  that	  favor	  terrorism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  violence.	  However,	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he	  investigates	  the	  influence	  of	  terrorist	  events	  on	  the	  occurrence	  of	  civil	  war	  using	  a	  limited	  time	  sample,	  leaving	  open	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  pertaining	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  civil	  war	  on	  the	  opportunity	  for	  terrorists	  to	  organize	  within	  a	  particular	  state.	  	   Despite	  the	  limited	  empirical	  investigation	  into	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  on	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  in	  comparison	  to	  its	  rigorous	  investigation	  in	  the	  civil	  conflict	  literature,	  Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  (2002)	  posit	  a	  stimulating	  argument	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  failure	  on	  the	  incidence	  of	  terrorism.	  They	  argue	  that	  failing	  or	  failed	  states	  allow	  terrorists	  to	  run	  their	  operations	  without	  the	  risk	  of	  interference	  from	  state	  authorities.	  Failing	  states	  allow	  for	  greater	  territorial	  acquisition,	  provide	  a	  political	  vacuum	  to	  fill,	  a	  pool	  of	  recruits	  from	  which	  to	  draw,	  and	  a	  veneer	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  offers	  protection	  from	  third	  party	  intervention	  in	  their	  operations.	  Piazza	  (2008)	  expands	  their	  argument	  by	  stipulating	  that	  weak	  or	  failing	  states	  increase	  the	  opportunity	  for	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  by	  freeing	  resources	  typically	  allocated	  towards	  state	  evasion	  and	  thus	  lowering	  the	  overall	  costs	  of	  operation.	  These	  scholars	  are	  essentially	  arguing	  that	  states	  with	  limited	  capacity	  to	  address	  and	  effectively	  police	  the	  population	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  for	  terrorist	  organization	  formation.	  	   While	  others	  (Ehrlich	  and	  Liu	  2002;	  Gunaratna	  2002)	  have	  argued	  along	  similar	  lines,	  there	  exist	  contradicting	  hypotheses	  (Menkhaus	  2003;	  Schneckener	  2004;	  Von	  Hippel	  2002).	  Menkhaus	  (2003)	  and	  Von	  Hippel	  (2002)	  both	  posit	  the	  idea	  that	  failed	  states	  are	  undesirable	  locations	  for	  terrorist	  activities	  because	  they	  are	  actually	  more	  prone	  to	  third	  party	  policing.	  Newman	  (2007)	  falls	  in	  between	  these	  two	  lines	  of	  thought	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by	  stipulating	  that	  terrorists	  operate	  and	  target	  state	  institutions	  because	  they	  are	  strong	  or	  because	  they	  are	  already	  contested.	  	   These	  studies	  contend	  that	  state	  capacity	  influences	  the	  occurrence	  of	  terrorism	  either	  negatively	  or	  positively,	  though	  they	  fail	  to	  provide	  sufficient	  evidence	  for	  either	  viewpoint.	  Newman’s	  (2007)	  results	  point	  to	  the	  weakness	  of	  states	  as	  a	  facilitating	  factor	  in	  terrorist	  events	  but	  he	  admits	  that	  the	  evidence	  is	  weak	  and	  insufficient.	  Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  (2002)	  fail	  to	  test	  their	  theory	  while	  Gunaratna	  (2002)	  limits	  his	  investigation	  to	  Al-­‐Qaeda.	  Likewise,	  empirical	  investigations	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  on	  terrorism	  have	  been	  limited	  to	  its	  effect	  on	  individual	  terrorist	  participation	  (Ehrlich	  and	  Liu	  2002;	  Piazza	  2008)	  while	  neglecting	  the	  role	  of	  state	  capacity	  in	  influencing	  terrorist	  organization	  formation.	  Consequently,	  this	  is	  a	  theme	  throughout	  the	  terrorism	  literature.	  Many	  studies	  stem	  from	  an	  opportunity	  and/or	  willingness	  perspective	  for	  explaining	  the	  occurrence	  of	  terrorism,	  but	  they	  concentrate	  on	  individual	  participation	  or	  the	  occurrence	  of	  terrorist	  attacks.	  	  	   Those	  who	  have	  focused	  on	  terrorist	  organizations	  have	  concentrated	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  organizational	  structure	  and	  internal	  dynamics	  on	  group	  behavior	  (Crenshaw	  1988).	  This	  approach	  counters	  the	  rational	  choice	  understanding	  of	  the	  use	  of	  terrorism	  by	  arguing	  for	  the	  use	  of	  terrorism	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  internal	  group	  dynamics	  opposed	  to	  strategic	  reactions	  to	  the	  external	  environment.	  Scholars	  in	  this	  vein	  have	  stipulated	  that	  terrorist	  behavior	  is	  a	  result	  of	  terrorist	  organizations’	  clandestine	  requirement	  (Crenshaw	  1985;	  Erikson	  1981;	  McCormick	  and	  Owen	  2000),	  bias	  towards	  action	  (Crenshaw	  1985;	  Hoffman	  1998;	  Kellen	  1979;	  Laquer	  1987;	  Post	  1990),	  or	  inter-­‐organizational	  competition	  
	  	  	  15	  	  
(Crenshaw	  1985;	  DeNardo	  1985;	  Jenkins	  1981;	  Laquer	  1987;	  McCauley	  and	  Segal	  1987).	  While	  this	  view	  focuses	  on	  terrorist	  organizations,	  contrary	  to	  individual	  terrorists	  or	  terrorist	  attacks,	  it	  assumes	  the	  presence	  of	  organizations	  while	  neglecting	  the	  forces	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	   This	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  terrorism	  and	  civil	  war	  literatures	  has	  highlighted	  three	  puzzles	  in	  the	  terrorism	  literature	  based	  on	  the	  overlap	  of	  explanatory	  theories	  with	  the	  research	  on	  civil	  conflict:	  the	  deficiency	  of	  research	  on	  the	  conditions	  that	  facilitate	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  in	  favor	  of	  terrorist	  activities	  or	  participation	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict	  on	  terrorist	  organization	  formation.	  These	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  exist	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  codified	  data	  on	  the	  location	  and	  timing	  of	  terrorist	  organizations’	  base	  of	  operations.	  It	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  these	  data	  do	  not	  exist	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  difficulty	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  domestic	  terrorist	  and	  rebel	  organizations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  difficulty	  in	  identifying	  terrorist	  groups’	  exact	  locations.	  However,	  without	  these	  data,	  investigations	  into	  the	  conditions	  that	  facilitate	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  have	  remained	  qualitative	  and	  empirically	  limited.	  This	  study	  attempts	  to	  solve	  these	  puzzles	  by	  coding	  this	  missing	  data	  and	  empirically	  testing	  an	  opportunity-­‐willingness	  argument	  for	  understanding	  the	  presence	  of	  terrorist	  organizations	  as	  functions	  of	  state	  capacity,	  civil	  conflict,	  and	  conditions	  that	  influence	  the	  population’s	  willingness	  to	  harbor	  terrorist	  groups	  or	  be	  recruited	  into	  them.	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Opportunity,	  Willingness,	  and	  Transnational	  Terrorist	  Organizations	  	   As	  Kalyvas	  (2004)	  discusses,	  the	  violence	  in	  civil	  war	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  terrorism,	  particularly	  at	  earlier	  stages	  in	  a	  conflict.	  Most	  terrorists	  are	  not	  seeking	  to	  overthrow	  a	  government,	  but	  many	  rebel	  groups	  who	  do	  wish	  to	  overthrow	  the	  government	  use	  terrorism	  as	  a	  method	  of	  attack	  when	  resources	  and	  information	  are	  low.	  This	  study	  mitigates	  the	  dilemma	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  a	  rebel	  and	  terrorist	  group	  by	  looking	  exclusively	  at	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations.	  Enders	  and	  Sandler	  (2006)	  define	  transnational	  terrorism	  as	  an	  incident	  in	  one	  country	  that	  involves	  perpetrators,	  victims,	  institutions,	  governments	  or	  citizens	  of	  another	  country.	  However,	  this	  definition	  falls	  prey	  to	  the	  assumptive	  focus	  on	  the	  incidence	  of	  terrorism,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  organization.	  	  	   So	  what	  makes	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  transnational?	  A	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  is	  here	  understood	  as	  any	  terrorist	  group	  basing	  their	  operations	  for	  recruitment,	  training,	  and	  fund	  raising	  in	  one	  state	  in	  order	  to	  conduct	  attacks	  in	  another.	  The	  process	  of	  organization	  formation,	  recruitment,	  training,	  planning,	  and	  attack	  take	  place	  across	  state	  borders,	  thus	  designating	  the	  terrorist	  organization’s	  operations	  as	  transnational.	  While	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  may	  contain	  active	  cells	  in	  any	  number	  of	  states,	  they	  often	  have	  one	  or	  two	  states	  in	  which	  they	  conduct	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  operations	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  capacity	  to	  implement	  attacks	  in	  another	  state.	  These	  centers	  of	  organization	  are	  deemed	  “bases	  of	  operations”.	  The	  largely	  unexplored	  effects	  of	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict	  on	  the	  opportunity	  for	  these	  bases	  to	  emerge	  comprise	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	  study.	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   This	  argument	  stems	  from	  an	  opportunity-­‐willingness	  perspective	  for	  understanding	  the	  formation	  of	  terrorist	  organizations.	  While	  the	  grievance	  perspective	  highlights	  the	  influence	  of	  grievances	  as	  motivation	  for	  rebel	  or	  terrorist	  participation	  or	  action,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  stipulates	  the	  necessity	  for	  the	  opportunity	  to	  express	  such	  grievances.	  Therefore	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  population	  willing	  to	  harbor	  and	  provide	  recruits	  to	  terrorist	  organizations	  as	  well	  as	  an	  environment	  that	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  for	  organization	  are	  both	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  	  	  	   As	  the	  research	  on	  failing	  and	  failed	  states	  and	  terrorism	  (Ehrlich	  and	  Liu	  2002;	  Gunaratna	  2002;	  Piazza	  2008;	  Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  2002)	  demonstrates,	  the	  opportunity	  for	  organization	  occurs	  as	  a	  function	  of	  cost/benefit	  analyses	  which	  are,	  in	  turn,	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  interference	  that	  terrorists	  can	  expect	  from	  a	  state.	  These	  weak	  states	  are	  unable	  to	  fully	  project	  their	  power	  within	  their	  borders	  and	  monopolize	  force	  against	  other,	  non-­‐state	  state	  actors	  due	  to	  incompetent	  or	  corrupt	  law	  enforcement	  institutions	  (Piazza	  2008;	  Rotberg	  2002).	  The	  lowered	  risk	  of	  state	  interference	  reduces	  the	  costs	  of	  fund	  raising,	  recruitment,	  and	  weapons	  obtainment,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  opportunity	  for	  terrorist	  organizations	  to	  form.	  Therefore,	  I	  expect	  to	  find	  that	  H1:	  The	  lower	  a	  state’s	  capacity,	  the	  more	  likely	  that	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  will	  be	  based	  in	  that	  state.	  	   Civil	  conflict	  enters	  the	  equation	  via	  two	  distinct	  mechanisms.	  Firstly,	  the	  state	  capacity	  perspective	  models	  the	  occurrence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  either	  maintain	  a	  monopoly	  of	  coercive	  power	  or	  to	  address	  population	  grievances.	  Consequently,	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  civil	  conflict	  signals	  the	  incapacity	  of	  state	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institutions	  in	  one	  or	  both	  of	  these	  areas.	  When	  faced	  with	  an	  uprising,	  a	  state	  can	  choose	  to	  accommodate	  the	  group’s	  demands	  or	  repress	  them	  with	  violence,	  either	  of	  which	  will	  result	  in	  a	  negative	  payoff	  for	  the	  state	  relative	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  rebellion	  (Ginkel	  and	  Smith	  1999).	  The	  occurrence	  of	  rebellion	  provides	  information	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  monitor	  and	  censor	  non-­‐state	  organizations	  without	  the	  cost	  that	  such	  information	  usually	  requires.	  	  	   The	  role	  of	  information	  and	  signaling	  has	  been	  heavily	  investigated	  throughout	  the	  conflict	  literature,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  interstate	  warfare	  (Fearon	  1995,	  1997;	  Morrow	  1999)	  but	  also	  to	  rebellion	  and	  revolution	  (Denardo	  1985;	  Kuran	  1989,	  1995;	  Lohmann	  1994;	  Sandler	  1992).	  The	  ability	  of	  any	  actor	  to	  act	  rationally	  by	  conducting	  a	  cost/benefit	  analysis	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  and	  amount	  of	  information	  available	  to	  them.	  This	  information	  can	  be	  conveyed	  via	  signaling.	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  a	  regime	  to	  state	  that	  it	  is	  capable	  or	  willing	  to	  repress	  a	  rebellion	  or	  monitor	  terrorist	  activities.	  It	  must	  provide	  information	  on	  its	  capability	  and	  willingness	  by	  signaling	  its	  preferences.	  Whether	  signaling	  preferences	  to	  other	  states	  or	  non-­‐state	  dissent	  groups,	  a	  credible	  signal	  is	  inherently	  costly	  (Denardo	  1985;	  Fearon	  1997;	  Kuran	  1995).	  Therefore,	  although	  costly	  for	  either	  the	  state	  or	  the	  rebels,	  the	  occurrence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  provides	  cost-­‐free	  information	  on	  state	  capacity	  to	  terrorist	  organizations.	  This	  allows	  them	  to	  make	  decisions	  with	  more	  complete	  information	  than	  would	  have	  otherwise	  been	  obtained.	  	  	   Secondly,	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  increasingly	  reduces	  the	  costs	  of	  organization	  for	  transnational	  terrorists	  relative	  to	  other	  weak	  states.	  Civil	  conflict	  is	  an	  inherently	  costly	  and	  destructive	  phenomenon.	  Even	  if	  rebels	  miscalculate	  state	  capacity	  when	  choosing	  to	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rebel,	  the	  rebellion	  itself	  will	  ultimately	  be	  costly	  for	  the	  state	  (Thies	  2010).	  Therefore,	  pending	  rebel	  miscalculation	  on	  state	  capacity,	  state	  institutions	  are	  inevitably	  weaker	  during	  and	  after	  a	  civil	  conflict	  than	  before.	  Rebellion	  also	  reduces	  the	  costs	  of	  acquiring	  weapons	  since	  civil	  conflicts	  tend	  to	  coincide	  with	  a	  proliferation	  of	  weapons	  smuggling.	  Additionally,	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  signals	  the	  divergence	  of	  state	  resources	  towards	  addressing	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  rebels	  whether	  in	  the	  form	  of	  repression	  or	  accommodation,	  offering	  a	  cover	  of	  chaos	  for	  terrorists	  to	  exploit	  (Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  2002).	  All	  of	  these	  conditions	  produced	  by	  the	  occurrence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  point	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  opportunity	  for	  terrorist	  organizations	  to	  form	  and	  operate	  in	  a	  state	  that	  is	  currently	  experiencing	  a	  civil	  conflict.	  H2:	  The	  presence	  of	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  in	  a	  state	  will	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  will	  be	  based	  in	  that	  state.	  	   A	  final	  condition	  that	  is	  explored	  in	  terms	  of	  increasing	  the	  opportunity	  for	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  is	  the	  contiguity	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  the	  group’s	  operations	  are	  based	  to	  the	  state	  in	  which	  they	  conduct	  attacks.	  This	  represents	  a	  new	  variable	  yet	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  terrorism	  literature	  since	  terrorist	  groups	  have,	  until	  now,	  not	  been	  differentiated	  based	  on	  location	  and	  target.	  The	  definition	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  utilized	  in	  this	  study,	  however,	  allows	  for	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  contiguity	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  organize	  and	  operate.	  As	  the	  research	  on	  interstate	  conflict	  demonstrates,	  contiguity	  is	  a	  highly	  salient	  indicator	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict	  given	  the	  opportunity	  it	  creates	  for	  increased	  interaction	  between	  states	  (Diehl	  1985;	  Vasquez	  1993;	  Wallensteen	  1981).	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   Similarly,	  the	  contiguity	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  is	  based	  to	  the	  one	  that	  constitutes	  or	  contains	  the	  organization’s	  target(s)	  creates	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  terrorist	  organization.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  protection	  offered	  by	  state	  sovereignty,	  an	  element	  discussed	  in	  the	  failing/failed	  state	  literature	  (Piazza	  2008;	  Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  2002).	  While	  these	  studies	  look	  to	  the	  doctrine	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  as	  protection	  from	  third	  party	  or	  outside	  state	  intervention	  in	  operations	  in	  failing	  or	  failed	  states,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  protection	  applies	  to	  any	  state	  that	  does	  not	  contain	  or	  constitute	  the	  target	  of	  the	  terrorists’	  activities.	  Operating	  in	  a	  state	  contiguous	  to	  their	  target	  offers	  the	  protection	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  from	  outside	  intervention.	  H3:	  A	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  base	  their	  operations	  in	  a	  state	  that	  is	  contiguous	  to	  their	  target	  state.	  	   Although	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  is	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  organize	  a	  terrorist	  organization,	  the	  conflict	  literature	  stipulates	  the	  necessity	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  opportunity	  and	  willingness	  for	  organization	  or	  action	  to	  occur	  (Most	  and	  Starr	  1989;	  Starr	  1978;	  Starr	  and	  Thomas	  2005).	  It	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  explore	  the	  conditions	  that	  create	  a	  population	  willing	  to	  be	  recruited	  into	  or,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  abide	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  terrorist	  organization.	  Due	  to	  the	  discrepancy	  of	  results	  in	  the	  terrorism	  literature,	  both	  political	  and	  socioeconomic	  conditions	  are	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Political	  freedom	  or	  lack	  thereof	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  a	  motivating	  factor	  in	  both	  terrorist	  recruitment	  (Gunaratna	  2002;	  Krueger	  and	  Laitin	  2007)	  and	  terrorist	  incidents	  (Abadie	  2004,	  2006).	  Therefore,	  H4:	  A	  state	  with	  more	  political	  freedom	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  contain	  a	  base	  for	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	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Poverty	  and	  linguistic	  fractionalization	  have	  also	  been	  speculated	  to	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  terrorist	  incidents	  and	  individual	  participation.	  Hassan’s	  (2001)	  interviews	  with	  failed	  suicide	  bombers	  prompts	  him	  to	  posit	  the	  “Robin	  Hood	  effect”	  by	  which	  individuals	  become	  terrorists	  due	  to	  poverty	  in	  their	  country,	  rather	  than	  their	  own,	  personal	  poverty.	  The	  positive	  influence	  of	  linguistic	  fractionalization	  on	  a	  country’s	  terrorist	  risk	  (Abadie	  2006)	  is	  here	  interpreted	  as	  providing	  the	  potential	  for	  exploitation	  of	  internal	  divisions	  and	  grievances	  by	  terrorist	  organizations.	  The	  presence	  of	  grievances	  provides	  a	  more	  willing	  population	  from	  which	  to	  recruit	  and	  hide	  amongst.	  While	  Abadie	  (2006)	  only	  looked	  to	  linguistic	  fractionalization,	  this	  study	  also	  takes	  ethnic	  divisions	  into	  account	  so	  that,	  H5:	  A	  state	  with	  greater	  ethnolinguistic	  heterogeneity	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  harbor	  a	  base	  of	  operations	  for	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  and,	  H8:	  The	  higher	  a	  state’s	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  the	  less	  likely	  that	  state	  is	  to	  harbor	  a	  base	  of	  operations	  for	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  Finally,	  the	  analysis	  controls	  for	  regime	  type,	  membership	  in	  Oil	  and	  Petroleum	  Exporting	  Countries	  (OPEC),	  population	  size	  and	  growth.	  These	  hypotheses	  allow	  for	  the	  specification	  of	  an	  empirical	  model	  that	  will	  appropriately	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  state’s	  capacity	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  on	  the	  opportunity	  for	  transnational	  terrorists	  to	  organize	  and	  operate.	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Data	  and	  Design	  The	  Dependent	  Variable	  	   The	  coding	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  deserves	  particular	  attention	  given	  the	  particular	  definition	  of	  transitional	  terrorism	  that	  is	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  Transnational	  terrorism	  has	  largely	  been	  explored	  as	  an	  abstract	  concept	  in	  which	  terrorist	  organizations	  acquire	  recruits,	  arms,	  and	  conduct	  operations	  across	  state	  borders.	  However,	  this	  definition	  makes	  specification	  of	  these	  organizations’	  location	  and	  subsequent	  analysis	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  group	  in	  a	  particular	  location	  impossible.	  In	  this	  light,	  I	  have	  defined	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  as	  those	  terrorist	  groups	  who	  base	  their	  recruitment,	  training,	  and	  weapons	  acquisition	  in	  one	  state	  in	  order	  to	  conduct	  attacks	  in	  another.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  group	  that	  meets	  these	  qualifications	  was	  coded	  as	  1	  for	  every	  year	  that	  a	  group	  was	  present	  in	  a	  state	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  This	  information	  was	  procured	  from	  START’s	  TOPs	  which	  provides	  detailed	  information	  on	  all	  known	  terrorist	  organizations,	  their	  location,	  and	  the	  known	  years	  in	  which	  they	  are	  active.	  	  	   However,	  due	  to	  the	  inherently	  elusive	  nature	  of	  terrorist	  organizations,	  much	  of	  the	  information	  had	  to	  be	  interpreted	  and	  additional	  research	  was	  required.	  It	  was	  often	  the	  case	  that	  no	  specific	  date	  was	  given	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  terrorist	  organization.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  date	  of	  the	  first	  known	  attack	  by	  a	  group,	  as	  specified	  by	  START’s	  Global	  Terrorism	  Database2,	  was	  used	  as	  the	  start	  date.	  Groups	  that	  had	  no	  exact	  start	  date,	  nor	  evidence	  of	  any	  attacks	  were	  left	  out	  of	  sample.	  Additionally,	  START	  does	  not	  differentiate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/	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between	  terrorist	  and	  insurgent	  or	  rebel	  groups.	  While	  focusing	  on	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  mitigated	  this	  dilemma,	  decisions	  had	  to	  be	  made	  concerning	  a	  group’s	  rebel	  or	  terrorist	  status	  based	  on	  the	  organization’s	  structure,	  objectives,	  and	  perpetuation	  of	  operations.	  Groups	  that	  were	  deemed	  “insurgent”,	  held	  the	  specific	  objective	  of	  government	  overthrow,	  or	  conducted	  their	  operations	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  a	  military	  campaign	  were	  left	  out	  of	  the	  sample.	  	  	   	  This	  study	  looks	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  on	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  without	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  state	  sponsorship.	  In	  order	  to	  control	  for	  state	  sponsorship	  of	  terrorist	  organizations,	  any	  group	  specified	  as	  receiving	  funding	  from	  a	  state	  was	  left	  out	  of	  the	  sample.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  efficient	  and	  appropriate	  manner	  of	  control	  although	  there	  is	  sure	  to	  be	  some	  element	  of	  clandestine	  state	  funding	  for	  certain	  groups	  that	  made	  their	  way	  into	  the	  sample.	  Additionally,	  due	  to	  the	  highly	  decentralized	  nature	  of	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  following	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  by	  NATO	  forces,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  was	  limited	  to	  its	  years	  located	  in	  the	  Sudan	  and	  Afghanistan	  prior	  to	  the	  9/11	  attacks.	  Finally,	  there	  are	  a	  plethora	  of	  terrorist	  incidents	  by	  various	  groups	  against	  American	  interests	  or	  embassies	  around	  the	  world.	  While	  these	  do	  entail	  organization	  formation	  in	  one	  state	  to	  indirectly	  attack	  another,	  they	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  ability	  to	  organize	  in	  order	  to	  conduct	  attacks	  across	  state	  borders	  and	  so	  were	  thus	  left	  out	  of	  the	  sample.	  	   Ultimately,	  the	  decisions	  over	  which	  terrorist	  groups	  in	  which	  years	  to	  include	  in	  the	  sample	  were	  designed	  to	  limit	  the	  occurrence	  of	  Type	  I	  error	  so	  as	  to	  not	  bias	  the	  sample	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations.	  While	  I	  have	  no	  doubts	  that	  there	  remains	  room	  for	  improvement	  in	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable,	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the	  efforts	  undertaken	  here	  represent	  a	  considerable	  advancement	  towards	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  valid	  variable	  that	  captures	  the	  location	  and	  time	  frame	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  It	  is	  only	  through	  this	  coding	  that	  we	  acquire	  the	  ability	  to	  test	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  such	  organizations.	  	  Table	  1:	  Dependent	  Variable	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  	  
Region	   Countries	  in	  Sample	   Country-­years	  in	  sample	  
Middle	  East	   10	   153	  
Asia	   11	   149	  
Africa	   8	   137	  
Europe	   7	   78	  
North	  Africa	   4	   55	  
Latin	  America	   5	   20	  
North	  America	   1	   11	  
Total	   47	   603	  	  	   Descriptive	  statistics	  for	  the	  dependent	  variable	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  1.	  After	  the	  inclusion	  of	  all	  variables,	  there	  are	  a	  total	  of	  47	  countries	  and	  603	  country	  years	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  The	  majority	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  are	  concentrated	  in	  Middle	  East,	  Asia,	  and	  Africa	  but	  are	  relatively	  evenly	  disbursed	  between	  these	  three	  regions.	  Latin	  America	  and	  North	  America	  are	  the	  most	  under	  sampled	  regions	  with	  Europe	  and	  North	  Africa	  falling	  in	  the	  middle.	  This	  provides	  confidence	  that	  the	  sample	  is	  not	  bias	  conditions	  in	  a	  particular	  region.	  3	  The	  Independent	  Variables	  	   State	  Capacity	  is	  operationalized	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  a	  state’s	  expected	  to	  actual	  revenue	  extraction	  using	  the	  Relative	  Political	  Capacity	  (RPC)	  dataset.	  First	  used	  by	  Organski	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A	  comprehensive	  list	  of	  all	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  A.1.	  of	  the	  appendix.	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Kugler	  (1980),	  this	  variable	  is	  designed	  to	  measure	  the	  resource	  needs	  of	  a	  state	  and	  the	  enforcement	  capacity	  to	  procure	  these	  resources	  from	  its	  population.	  Although	  there	  has	  been	  considerable	  debate	  pertaining	  to	  the	  appropriate	  measure	  of	  state	  capacity,	  this	  measurement	  addresses	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  other,	  most	  oft	  used	  measurement:	  total	  taxes/GDP	  (Hendrix	  2010).	  First,	  it	  controls	  for	  factors	  that	  influence	  the	  collection	  of	  revenues	  not	  captured	  by	  the	  more	  simplistic	  measurement	  by	  including	  mining,	  exports,	  and	  agriculture	  as	  ratios	  of	  GDP	  depending	  on	  the	  wealth	  level	  of	  the	  country	  (Johnson	  and	  Arbetman-­‐Rabinowitz	  2005).	  Second,	  RPC	  more	  appropriately	  captures	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  state	  institutions	  in	  terms	  of	  resource	  extraction	  by	  differentiating	  between	  those	  states	  that	  did	  and	  did	  not	  procure	  their	  expected	  revenue	  extraction.	  A	  low	  total	  taxes/GDP	  ratio	  does	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  a	  lower	  capacity	  to	  extract	  resources	  but	  may	  demonstrate	  a	  lower	  need	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	   Although	  this	  measurement	  represents	  an	  improvement	  over	  other	  options,	  it	  is	  not	  without	  its	  own	  limitations.	  Like	  total	  taxes/GDP,	  it	  is	  does	  not	  completely	  distinguish	  between	  revenue	  acquired	  from	  direct	  or	  indirect	  forms	  of	  taxation.	  Direct	  forms	  of	  taxation	  require	  more	  investment	  in	  institutional	  mechanisms	  for	  population	  monitoring	  and	  compliance	  whereas	  indirect	  taxes	  may	  be	  acquired	  without	  this	  investment	  (Hendrix	  2010).	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  revenue	  from	  oil	  exports,	  a	  control	  for	  OPEC	  membership	  is	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Additionally,	  state	  capacity	  is	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  concept	  (Cummings	  and	  Norgaard	  2004;	  Hendrix	  2010;	  Sobek	  2010)	  and	  this	  measurement	  only	  captures	  one,	  although	  arguably	  the	  most	  salient,	  dimension.	  However,	  every	  study	  has	  its	  limits	  and	  the	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  create	  a	  new	  measure	  of	  state	  capacity	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but	  to	  apply	  the	  most	  valid	  and	  appropriate	  one	  available.	  In	  this	  light,	  RPC	  will	  suffice	  for	  capturing	  the	  ability	  of	  state	  institutions	  to	  extract	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  functionally	  operate,	  address	  grievances,	  and	  police	  the	  population.	  	  	   Civil	  Conflict	  has	  two	  operationalizations	  designed	  to	  capture	  two	  levels	  of	  conflict	  intensity.	  The	  first	  variable	  for	  civil	  conflict	  is	  coded	  using	  the	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  (UCDP)	  conflict	  termination	  dataset.	  This	  dataset	  gives	  start	  and	  end	  dates,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  locations	  for	  conflicts	  between	  two	  actors,	  ones	  of	  which	  is	  a	  state	  government	  and	  in	  which	  there	  were	  at	  least	  25	  battles	  deaths	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  Given	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  civil	  conflict	  on	  the	  opportunity	  for	  transnational	  terrorists	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  state	  experiencing	  the	  conflict,	  civil	  conflicts	  that	  occurred	  outside	  of	  a	  state’s	  territory	  are	  left	  out	  of	  the	  sample	  while	  interstate	  conflicts	  involving	  disputes	  over	  territory	  contiguous	  to	  both	  states	  involved	  are	  included.	  For	  example,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  conflicts	  over	  colonial	  territories	  are	  not	  included	  while	  the	  territorial	  dispute	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  over	  the	  Kashmir	  area	  is	  included.	  All	  conflicts	  are	  coded	  1	  for	  every	  year	  that	  a	  conflict	  is	  ongoing	  in	  the	  location(s)	  specified	  by	  the	  dataset	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  	  	   The	  second	  operationalization	  of	  civil	  conflict	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  Correlates	  of	  War	  (COW)	  dataset.	  For	  a	  conflict	  to	  be	  coded	  as	  ongoing	  the	  state	  must	  mobilize	  at	  least	  1,000	  troops	  and	  experience	  at	  least	  100	  battle	  deaths	  in	  a	  year	  while	  the	  non-­‐state	  actor	  need	  only	  mobilize	  100	  troops	  and	  experience	  25	  battle	  deaths	  in	  a	  year.	  This	  captures	  a	  higher	  intensity	  of	  civil	  conflict	  than	  the	  UCDP	  data,	  although	  they	  include	  colonial	  wars.	  In	  certain	  instances,	  such	  as	  when	  neither	  side	  is	  designated	  as	  a	  state	  government	  or	  the	  location	  given	  is	  uncertain,	  a	  conflict	  is	  left	  out	  of	  the	  sample.	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   Contiguity	  is	  coded	  a	  1	  for	  every	  year	  in	  the	  state	  that	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  is	  based	  if	  the	  target	  of	  the	  terrorist	  organization	  resides	  in	  a	  contiguous	  state	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  For	  simplification,	  I	  determined	  who	  the	  target	  of	  each	  terrorist	  group	  was	  based	  on	  the	  TOPs	  information	  and	  limited	  contiguity	  to	  a	  shared	  land	  border.	  RealGDP	  was	  obtained	  from	  the	  RPC	  dataset	  which	  uses	  and	  supplements	  both	  the	  World	  Penn	  Tables	  2000	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators.	  	  	   Freedom	  is	  operationalized	  using	  the	  Freedom	  House	  scores	  on	  political	  freedom	  and	  civil	  rights.	  They	  designate	  each	  state	  as	  free,	  partially	  free,	  or	  not	  free	  based	  on	  scores	  ranging	  from	  0-­‐100	  which	  indicate	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  state’s	  population	  to	  participate	  freely	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  vote	  freely	  in	  legitimate	  elections,	  have	  representatives	  that	  are	  accountable	  to	  them,	  exercise	  freedoms	  of	  expression	  and	  belief,	  be	  able	  to	  freely	  assemble	  and	  associate,	  have	  access	  to	  an	  established	  and	  equitable	  system	  of	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  enjoy	  social	  and	  economic	  freedoms.4	  	  States	  designated	  as	  not	  free	  are	  coded	  0,	  partially	  free	  are	  coded	  1,	  and	  free	  are	  coded	  2	  in	  the	  appropriate	  years.	  Prior	  to	  1989	  Freedom	  House	  did	  not	  provide	  the	  score	  but	  merely	  its	  level	  of	  freedom,	  one	  for	  broadcast	  and	  one	  for	  print	  media.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  lower	  designation	  is	  coded.	  	   Although	  the	  Freedom	  House	  scores	  are	  not	  without	  issue,	  their	  inclusion	  captures	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  grievances	  based	  on	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  and	  civil	  rights.	  While	  many	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  variable	  for	  democracy	  would	  sufficiently	  capture	  the	  potential	  for	  grievances,	  I	  do	  not	  assume	  that	  electoral	  democracy	  goes	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  political	  freedom.	  The	  ability	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  representative	  does	  not	  capture	  the	  potential	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-­‐world-­‐aggregate-­‐and-­‐subcategory-­‐scores	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limited	  party	  options,	  censorship,	  corrupt	  judicial	  systems,	  or	  other	  politically	  limiting	  actions	  that	  can	  occur	  in	  a	  democratic	  state.	  Although	  I	  also	  include	  Polity	  IV	  scores	  as	  a	  control	  for	  regime	  type,	  the	  two	  measures	  are	  capturing	  different	  concepts:	  procedural	  democracy	  and	  political	  liberalism	  (Danilovic	  and	  Clare	  2007).	  5	  	   Finally,	  Ethnolinguistic	  Fractionalization	  (ELF)	  was	  obtained	  from	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin’s	  (2003)6	  replication	  data.	  This	  variable	  gives	  the	  probability	  that	  two	  randomly	  drawn	  individuals	  in	  a	  state	  will	  be	  from	  different	  ethnolinguistic	  groups.	  The	  operationalizations	  and	  coding	  of	  the	  control	  variables	  are	  included	  in	  the	  appendix.	  Design	  	   Due	  to	  the	  dichotomous	  nature	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  are	  analyzed	  through	  the	  estimation	  of	  a	  cross-­‐sectional,	  pooled,	  time	  series,	  logistic	  regression	  analysis.	  The	  intended	  sample	  ranged	  from	  1945	  to	  2011	  but	  after	  the	  inclusion	  of	  all	  variables	  is	  limited	  to	  1980-­‐2004.	  However,	  this	  time	  frame	  still	  provides	  appropriate	  variation	  by	  extending	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  eras	  and	  into	  the	  21st	  century.	  This	  estimation	  technique	  allows	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  opportunity	  and	  willingness,	  operating	  through	  state	  capacity,	  civil	  conflict,	  contiguity,	  political	  freedom,	  and	  ethnolinguistic	  fractionalization,	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  example,	  Italy,	  Jamaica,	  and	  South	  Korea	  (only	  a	  few	  examples)	  are	  consistently	  coded	  above	  the	  common	  democracy	  of	  6	  on	  the	  Polity	  IV	  scale	  but	  range	  from	  partially	  free	  to	  free	  on	  the	  Freedom	  House	  scale.	  6	  http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html	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Results	  	   To	  begin,	  Table	  2	  demonstrates	  the	  b	  coefficients	  and	  z-­‐scores	  in	  parentheses	  for	  the	  main	  models.	  Models	  1	  and	  2	  use	  the	  UCDP	  definition	  of	  civil	  conflict	  and	  Models	  3	  and	  4	  use	  the	  COW	  definition.	  Models	  1	  and	  3	  include	  the	  total	  population	  while	  Models	  2	  and	  4	  include	  population	  growth.	  The	  results	  are	  fairly	  consistent	  across	  models	  and	  provide	  food	  for	  thought	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  opportunity	  and	  willingness	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations.7	  	  Table	  2:	  Logistic	  Regression	  Analysis	  	  








Opportunity	  Variables	   	  	   State	  Capacity	   0.648	  ***	  (3.77)	   0.653	  ***	  (3.80)	   0.637	  ***	  (3.70)	   0.642	  ***	  (3.74)	  	   Civil	  Conflict	   0.426	  (1.92)	   0.417	  (1.87)	   0.558	  *	  (2.09)	   0.558	  *	  (2.10)	  	   Contiguity	   5.88	  ***	  (19.38)	   5.88	  ***	  (19.42)	   5.95	  ***	  (19.42)	   5.95	  ***	  (3.74)	  
Willingness	  Variables	  	   Freedom	   -­‐1.65	  ***	  (-­‐9.78)	   -­‐1.65	  ***	  (-­‐9.64)	   -­‐1.65	  ***	  (-­‐9.79)	   -­‐1.66	  ***	  (-­‐9.70)	  	   Real	  GDP	   -­‐3.25^07	  (-­‐0.02)	   -­‐9.16	  (0.95)	   -­‐4.40^06	  (-­‐0.28)	   -­‐5.85^06	  (-­‐0.36)	  	   ELF	   -­‐2.55***	  (-­‐7.22)	   -­‐2.55	  ***	  (-­‐7.19)	   -­‐2.67	  ***	  (-­‐7.22)	   -­‐2.66	  ***	  (-­‐7.20)	  
Control	  Variables	  
	   Regime	  Type	   0.008	  (1.54)	   0.009	  (1.53)	   0.008	  (1.46)	   0.008	  (1.45)	  
	   Population	   -­‐4.59^-­‐11	  (-­‐0.10)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   1.37^11	  (0.03)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	   Pop.	  Growth	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.013	  (-­‐0.19)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.034	  (-­‐0.48)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Preliminary	  variation	  inflation	  indicators	  (VIF)	  were	  obtained	  to	  verify	  a	  lack	  of	  multi-­‐collinearity.	  They	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  A.2.	  of	  the	  appendix.	  
	  	  	  30	  	  








Control	  Variables	  	   OPEC	   -­‐0.691	  *	  (02.04)	   -­‐0.678	  *	  (-­‐1.97)	   -­‐0.714	  *	  (-­‐2.09)	   -­‐0.685	  *	  (1.98)	  
Significance	  	  <0.05	  *	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <0.01	  **	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <	  0.001	  ***	  	  	   State	  capacity	  is	  highly	  significant	  and	  positive	  at	  the	  0.001	  level	  across	  all	  models	  which	  does	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  reject	  the	  null	  of	  hypothesis	  1.	  This	  initially	  suggests	  that	  state	  capacity	  is	  not	  influencing	  the	  presence	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  the	  manner	  previously	  theorized,	  although	  these	  results	  deserve	  closer	  attention.	  Both	  freedom	  and	  ELF	  are	  highly	  significant	  at	  the	  0.001	  level	  and	  negative	  across	  all	  models,	  indicating	  that	  states	  with	  less	  political	  and	  civil	  freedoms,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  more	  ethnolinguistically	  heterogeneous	  populations	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  harbor	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization,	  validating	  hypotheses	  4	  and	  5.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  freedom	  and	  ethnolinguistic	  divisions	  produce	  grievances	  within	  the	  population	  which	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  are	  able	  to	  exploit.	  A	  population	  whose	  freedoms	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  association	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  government,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  internal,	  ethnolinguistic	  divisions,	  is	  more	  willing	  to	  be	  recruited	  into	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  or	  abide	  its	  presence.	  This	  provides	  evidence	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  willing	  population	  on	  the	  location	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization,	  while	  the	  insignificant	  coefficient	  for	  real	  GDP	  implies	  that	  the	  production	  of	  grievances	  is	  occurring	  as	  a	  function	  of	  political	  repression	  as	  opposed	  to	  poverty.	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Opportunity	  Variables	  	   State	  
Capacity	  
0.656	  ***	  (3.77)	  	   0.639	  ***	  	  (3.67)	   0.249	  (1.13)	   0.305	  (1.42)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Both	  population	  total	  and	  population	  growth,	  alone	  and	  together,	  were	  included	  in	  all	  models	  but	  consistently	  failed	  to	  reach	  significance.	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Opportunity	  Variables	  	   Civil	  
Conflict	  
0.385	  	  (1.72)	   0.601	  **	  (2.26)	   -­‐0.834	  (-­‐1.86)	   -­‐0.506	  (-­‐1.04)	  	  	   Capacity	  *	  
Conflict	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   1.158	  **	  (3.17)	  	   	  1.032	  *	  (2.75)	  	   Contiguity	   6.03	  ***	  (18.95)	   	  6.1	  ***	  (19.06)	  	   	  6.16	  ***	  (18.76)	  	   6.15	  ***	  (18.89)	  	  
Willingness	  Variables	  	   Freedom	   	  -­‐2.08	  ***	  (-­‐4.38)	   -­‐2.22	  ***	  (-­‐4.62)	   -­‐1.98	  ***	  (-­‐4.12)	   -­‐2.053	  	  ***	  (-­‐4.27)	  	   Freedom2	   0.266	  (1.00)	   0.351	  (1.31)	   0.223	  	  (0.83)	   0.285	  (1.06)	  	   Real	  GDP	   	  -­‐0.000	  (-­‐1.15)	   -­‐0.00	  (-­‐1.52)	   -­‐0.000	  (-­‐1.62)	   -­‐0.000	  (-­‐1.73)	  	   ELF	   0.559	  (0.42)	   0.618	  	  (0.46)	   0.549	  (0.40)	   0.528	  (0.39)	  	   ELF2	   	  -­‐3.789	  *	  (-­‐2.38)	   	  -­‐4.04	  *	  (-­‐2.54)	   -­‐4.083	  *	  (-­‐2.51)	   -­‐4.17	  **	  (-­‐2.59)	  
Control	  Variables	  	   Regime	  
Type	  
0.008	  (1.36)	   0.007	  	  (1.29)	   0.009	  	  (1.65)	   0.008	  (1.40)	  	   Population	   	  4.06^11	  (0.09)	   	  8.93^-­‐11	  (0.20)	   3.41^-­‐11	  	  (0.08)	   1.08^-­‐10	  (0.25)	  	  	   OPEC	   -­‐0.528	  	  (-­‐1.51)	   -­‐0.52	  	  (-­‐1.51)	   -­‐0.388	  (-­‐1.11)	   -­‐0.347	  (-­‐0.98)	  
Significance	  	  <0.05	  *	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <0.01	  **	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <	  0.001	  ***	  	  	   However,	  these	  results	  deserve	  further	  analysis.	  Abadie	  (2004,	  2006)	  finds	  a	  non-­‐monotonic	  relationship	  between	  political	  freedom	  and	  a	  country’s	  risk	  for	  terrorism.	  Given	  these	  results,	  it	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  investigate	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  similar	  relationship	  in	  this	  instance.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  there	  is	  a	  middle	  range	  of	  political	  freedom	  between	  completely	  free	  and	  not	  free	  wherein	  grievances	  are	  produce	  and	  coincide	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	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actively	  express	  these	  grievances	  through	  a	  willingness	  to	  harbor	  terrorist	  organizations.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  a	  similar	  relationship	  is	  occurring	  between	  ELF	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations.	  To	  test	  these	  possibilities,	  a	  quadratic	  variable	  for	  each	  is	  added	  to	  the	  original	  models	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  3,	  Models	  1	  and	  2.	  Although	  the	  quadratic	  term	  for	  freedom	  is	  significant	  with	  a	  chi-­‐score	  of	  10.24,	  solving	  for	  the	  minimum	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  negative	  relationship	  bottoms	  out	  at	  a	  freedom	  value	  of	  4	  which	  exceeds	  the	  coded	  values.	  Political	  freedom	  is	  still	  negatively	  and	  linearly	  affecting	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  basing	  their	  operations	  in	  a	  state.	  	  	   The	  quadratic	  term	  for	  ELF,	  however,	  is	  not	  significant.	  The	  positive	  and	  insignificant	  original	  variable	  for	  ELF	  coupled	  with	  its	  significant	  and	  negative	  quadratic	  term	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  slight,	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  positive	  influence	  of	  increasing	  homogeneity	  until	  a	  certain	  point	  at	  which	  it	  negatively	  influences	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  Solving	  for	  the	  maximum	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  drawn	  from	  the	  same	  ethnic-­‐linguistic	  group	  is	  negatively	  affects	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transitional	  terrorist	  organization	  beginning	  at	  a	  value	  of	  -­‐1.609.	  Ultimately,	  the	  results	  for	  both	  variables	  are	  unchanged	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  quadratic	  terms.9	  	  	   An	  additional	  point	  that	  deserves	  attention	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  varies	  as	  a	  function	  of	  civil	  conflict.	  It	  was	  hypothesized	  that	  civil	  conflict	  positively	  affects	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  via	  two	  mechanisms:	  1)	  the	  transmission	  of	  information	  on,	  and	  2)	  the	  reduction	  in	  state	  capacity.	  Although	  the	  COW	  civil	  conflict	  variable	  was	  found	  to	  be	  positive	  and	  significant,	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Both	  sets	  of	  quadratic	  variables	  fail	  to	  reach	  significance	  in	  a	  negative	  binomial	  regression.	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capacity	  was	  positive	  and	  significant	  across	  all	  models,	  contrary	  to	  expectations.	  However,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  models	  are	  underspecified	  and	  require	  an	  interaction	  term	  to	  appropriately	  test	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  as	  moderated	  by	  civil	  conflict.	  Based	  on	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  original	  argument	  and	  hypothesis,	  I	  expect	  state	  capacity	  to	  exert	  an	  increasingly	  negative	  influence	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  when	  a	  civil	  conflict	  is	  ongoing,	  compared	  to	  when	  it	  is	  not.	  	  	  	   Models	  3	  and	  4	  in	  Table	  3	  display	  the	  results	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  freedom	  and	  ELF	  quadratic	  terms	  and	  an	  interaction	  term	  composed	  of	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict.	  The	  significant	  interaction	  term	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  slopes	  of	  state	  capacity	  depending	  on	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  or	  not.	  In	  order	  to	  test	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  overall	  interaction,	  a	  Chi-­‐square	  test	  was	  conducted	  for	  each	  model.	  The	  interaction	  is	  significant	  with	  a	  Chi-­‐square	  score	  of	  0.0193	  and	  two	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  in	  Model	  3	  but	  insignificant	  with	  a	  Chi-­‐square	  score	  of	  0.151	  in	  Model	  4.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  state	  capacity	  has	  statistically	  different	  effects	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  civil	  conflict	  variable,	  mainly	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict.	  	  	   To	  investigate	  these	  effects	  more	  closely,	  I	  obtain	  the	  slopes	  for	  state	  capacity	  based	  on	  the	  interaction	  term.	  The	  slopes	  for	  state	  capacity	  when	  there	  is	  no	  civil	  conflict	  is	  0.25	  but	  it	  is	  1.4	  when	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict.	  As	  opposed	  to	  an	  increasingly	  negative	  influence,	  state	  capacity’s	  positive	  influence	  increases	  when	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  war	  from	  when	  there	  is	  not.	  Again,	  state	  capacity	  is	  clearly	  not	  exerting	  an	  influence	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  in	  the	  manner	  originally	  hypothesized.	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Opportunity	  Variables	  	   State	  
Capacity	  
-­‐0.103	  (-­‐0.97)	  	  	   -­‐0.125	  (-­‐1.04)	  	  	   -­‐0.449	  **	  (-­‐3.40)	  	  	  	   -­‐0.188	  (-­‐1.52)	  	  	  	  	   Civil	  
Conflict	  
0.037	  	  	  (0.33)	  	   -­‐0.002	  	  (-­‐0.01)	   -­‐0.767	  ***	  	  	  (-­‐3.56)	  	   -­‐0.177	  (-­‐0.69)	  	  	  	  	   Capacity	  *	  
Conflict	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   0.889	  ***	  (4.25)	   0.187	  (0.75)	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Opportunity	  Variables	  	   Contiguity	   2.904	  ***	  (26.23)	   2.91	  ***	  (26.55)	  	   2.992	  ***	  (26.21)	   2.925	  ***	  	  	  (26.32)	  
Willingness	  Variables	  	   Freedom	   -­‐0.594	  ***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (-­‐6.61)	   -­‐0.591	  ***	  (-­‐6.58)	  	  	  	   -­‐0.428	  (-­‐1.81)	  	  	  	   -­‐0.356	  (-­‐1.50)	  	  	  	  	   Freedom2	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.079	  (-­‐0.60)	  	  	  	   -­‐0.12	  (-­‐0.91)	  	   Real	  GDP	   -­‐0.000	  	  	  (-­‐1.48)	   -­‐0.000	  (-­‐1.60)	   -­‐0.000	  (-­‐1.67)	  	  	  	   -­‐0.000	  (-­‐1.45)	  	  	  	  	   ELF	   -­‐1.427	  ***	  	  (-­‐7.56)	  	   -­‐1.423	  ***	  (-­‐7.39)	   -­‐0.199	  	  (-­‐0.30)	   -­‐0.105	  (-­‐0.16)	  	   ELF2	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   1.562	  *	  (-­‐1.97)	  	  	  	   -­‐1.571	  *	  (-­‐2.00)	  	  	  	  
Control	  Variables	  	   Regime	  
Type	  
0	  .004	  	  (1.27)	   0.004	  	  	  (1.25)	  	   0.003	  (0.93)	  	   0.002	  (0.81)	  	   Population	   3.43^10	  	  (1.07)	   3.55^10	  	  	  (1.12)	  	   3.72^-­‐10	  	  	  (1.17)	   4.10^-­‐10	  	  	  (1.28)	  	   OPEC	   -­‐0.219	  	   -­‐0.214	  (-­‐1.39)	  	  	  	   -­‐0.295	  	  	  	  (-­‐1.91)	  	  	  	   -­‐0.205	  (-­‐1.30)	  	  	  	  
Significance	  	  <0.05	  *	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <0.01	  **	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <	  0.001	  ***	  	   Indeed,	  the	  results	  of	  a	  negative	  binomial	  regression,	  with	  the	  dependent	  variable	  coded	  as	  a	  count	  of	  the	  number	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  a	  state	  in	  a	  given	  year,	  provides	  additional	  evidence	  for	  this	  argument.	  Table	  6	  shows	  that	  both	  state	  capacity	  and	  civil	  conflict	  lost	  significance	  in	  both	  base	  Models	  1	  and	  2	  but	  the	  interaction	  with	  the	  UCDP	  definition	  of	  civil	  conflict	  and	  state	  capacity	  is	  once	  again	  significant	  in	  Model	  3.	  When	  there	  is	  not	  a	  civil	  war	  ongoing,	  state	  capacity	  exerts	  a	  negative	  influence,	  as	  was	  originally	  hypothesized,	  while	  this	  effect	  becomes	  positive	  when	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict.	  The	  effect	  of	  civil	  conflict	  at	  varying	  levels	  of	  state	  capacity	  remains	  the	  same,	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negative	  when	  there	  is	  no	  state	  capacity	  and	  increasingly	  positive	  otherwise.	  Terrorists	  appear	  to	  be	  taking	  advantage	  of	  a	  divergence	  of	  state	  resources	  towards	  a	  civil	  conflict,	  rather	  than	  the	  chaos	  or	  weakened	  state	  capacity	  created	  by	  a	  civil	  conflict.	  	   While	  the	  negative	  binomial	  regression	  results	  provide	  some	  support	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  as	  was	  originally	  theorized,	  this	  only	  applies	  when	  there	  is	  no	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  and	  when	  the	  analysis	  is	  altered	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  presence	  of	  more	  than	  one	  organization.	  However,	  the	  results	  for	  the	  interactions	  in	  both	  the	  logit	  and	  negative	  binomial	  regressions	  are	  not	  robust	  as	  they	  only	  apply	  to	  the	  UCDP	  civil	  conflict	  definition.	  	  Additional	  research	  and	  analyses	  are	  needed	  to	  obtain	  a	  more	  robust	  and	  valid	  inference	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  behind	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  capacity,	  civil	  conflict,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	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Conclusion	  	   This	  study	  has	  attempted	  to	  address	  three	  empirical	  gaps	  in	  the	  terrorism	  literature:	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  study	  of	  civil	  conflict	  and	  terrorism	  despite	  overlapping	  explanatory	  theories,	  a	  neglect	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  capacity	  on	  terrorist	  organization	  formation	  and	  an	  overall	  neglect	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  individual	  participation	  or	  terrorist	  attacks.	  To	  fill	  in	  these	  gaps,	  I	  posited	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  as	  functions	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  organize	  and	  operate	  as	  well	  as	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  population	  to	  provide	  safe	  haven	  or	  act	  as	  a	  pool	  of	  recruits.	  	  	   The	  results	  of	  the	  empirical	  analyses	  support	  this	  understanding	  of	  terrorist	  organization	  formation,	  although	  not	  always	  in	  the	  manner	  originally	  hypothesized.	  State	  capacity,	  specifically,	  appears	  to	  be	  exerting	  an	  increasingly	  positive	  influence	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  depending	  on	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  war	  or	  not.	  This	  brings	  into	  question	  the	  failing/failed	  state	  arguments	  which	  stipulate	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  terrorist	  organizations	  presented	  by	  weak	  state	  institutional	  capability	  and	  political	  vacuums	  (Gunaratna	  2002;	  Piazza	  2008;	  Takeyh	  and	  Gvosdev	  2002).	  However,	  the	  sample	  of	  terrorist	  organizations	  in	  this	  study	  is	  limited	  to	  an	  exceptionally	  narrow	  definition	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization.	  While	  this	  mitigated	  the	  dilemma	  that	  occurs	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  rebel	  and	  terrorist	  organizations,	  it	  inevitably	  neglects	  the	  majority	  of	  terrorist	  organizations.	  Additionally,	  while	  steps	  were	  taken	  to	  control	  for	  state	  sponsorship	  of	  terrorist	  groups,	  it	  is	  possible	  this	  is	  influencing	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis.	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   Despite	  these	  weaknesses,	  there	  remains	  strong	  evidence	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  occurs	  as	  a	  function	  of	  both	  opportunity	  and	  willingness.	  The	  negative	  influences	  of	  political	  freedom	  and	  ethnolinguistic	  heterogeneity	  provide	  additional	  support	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  terrorism	  occurs	  as	  a	  function	  of	  repression	  and	  social	  divisions,	  not	  poverty.	  The	  positive	  effects	  of	  higher	  intensity	  civil	  conflict	  and	  contiguity	  provide	  evidence	  for	  the	  exploitation	  of	  chaos	  and	  opportunity.	  In	  turn,	  the	  positive	  influence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  only	  occurs	  when	  state	  capacity	  is	  greater	  than	  0,	  suggesting	  the	  opportunity	  is	  created	  through	  a	  divergence,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  limit,	  of	  state	  resources.	  Ultimately,	  these	  results	  demonstrate	  the	  need	  for	  both	  the	  opportunity	  to	  organize	  and	  the	  willingness	  to	  cooperate	  to	  be	  present	  in	  order	  for	  a	  transnational	  terrorist	  organization	  to	  form	  and	  operate.	  	  	   While	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study	  must	  be	  examined	  with	  possible	  flaws	  in	  mind,	  they	  provide	  an	  impetus	  for	  the	  need	  for	  additional	  research	  into	  the	  conditions	  that	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  and	  willingness	  for	  terrorist	  organizations	  to	  organize,	  operate,	  and	  exist.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  terrorist	  organizations	  is	  a	  fruitful	  avenue	  of	  pursuit.	  The	  literature	  has	  focused	  on	  what	  causes	  an	  individual	  to	  become	  a	  terrorist	  or	  the	  conditions	  that	  allow	  terrorist	  attacks	  to	  occur	  while	  neglecting	  the	  conditions	  that	  initially	  give	  rise	  to	  terrorist	  organizations.	  Without	  an	  understanding	  of	  their	  occurrence	  how	  can	  we	  possibly	  hope	  to	  limit	  their	  appearance	  and	  influence	  on	  the	  international	  stage?	  In	  much	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  the	  civil	  conflict	  literature	  has	  begun	  to	  form	  a	  consensus	  surrounding	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  rebel	  organizations,	  so	  too	  should	  the	  research	  on	  terrorism	  seek	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	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Active	  Years	   Region	   Target	  
Location	  
Afghanistan	  
al-­‐Gama'a	  al-­‐Islamiyya	  (GAI)	   1977-­‐2000	   Middle	  East	   Egypt	  
	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   1989-­‐1992	   	   USSR	  
	  
Egyptian	  Islamic	  jihad	   1989-­‐2001	   	   Egypt	  
	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   1996-­‐2001	   	   U.S.	  
	  
Islamic	  Movement	  of	  Uzbekistan	   1998-­‐	  2011	   	   Uzbekistan	  
	   Jund	  al-­‐sham	   1999-­‐2001	   	   Syria	  
Algeria	   Polisario	  Front	   1973-­‐2003	   North	  Africa	   Morocco	  
	  
Canary	  Islands	  Independence	  Movement	   1977-­‐1982	   	   Spain	  
	  
Islamic	  Salvation	  Front	   1989-­‐1997	   	   Iraq	  
Angola	  
Southwest	  Africa	  People's	  Organization	   1976-­‐1989	   Africa	   South	  Africa	  
Australia	   Ananda	  Marga	   1970-­‐1979	   Oceania	   India	  
Azerbaijan	  
Islamic	  International	  Peacekeeping	  Brigade	   1998-­‐2011	   Asia	   Russia	  
Bangladesh	  
People's	  Revolutionary	  Party	  of	  Kangleipak	   1977-­‐2011	   Asia	   India	  
	  
Revolutionary	  People's	  Front	   1979-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	  
National	  Liberation	  of	  Tripura	   1989-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	  
All	  Tripura	  Tiger	  Force	   1990-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	  
Kamtapur	  Liberations	  Organization	   1995-­‐	  2011	   	   India	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   Region	   Target	  
Location	  
Bangladesh	  
Achik	  National	  Volunteer	  Council	   1995-­‐2004	   Asia	   India	  
	  
Borok	  National	  Council	  of	  Tripura	   2000-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	  
United	  Achik	  National	  Front	  	   2004-­‐2006	   	   India	  
Belgium	  
New	  Armenian	  Resistance	   1977-­‐1983	   Europe	   multiple	  
Bhutan	  
National	  Democratic	  Front	  of	  Bodoland	   1988-­‐2011	   Asia	   India	  
	  
Kamtapur	  Liberations	  Organization	   1995-­‐	  2011	   	   India	  
	  
Bodo	  Liberation	  Tigers	   1996-­‐2003	   	   India	  
Bulgaria	  
Pan-­‐Turkish	  Organization	   1985-­‐1990	   Europe	   Netherlands	  
Cameroon	  
Movement	  for	  Democracy	  and	  Development	   1990-­‐2003	   Africa	   Chad	  
Chile	  
Proletarian	  Action	  Group	   1985	   Latin	  America	   Germany	  
Columbia	  
Latin	  American	  Patriotic	  Army	   2001	   Latin	  America	   Venezuela	  
Cuba	  
Independent	  Armed	  Revolutionary	  	  Movement	   1967-­‐1973	   Latin	  America	   U.S.	  
Dem.	  Congo	  
National	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Angola	   1962-­‐1990	   Africa	   Angola	  
	  
Lord's	  Resistance	  Army	   1994-­‐2011	   	   Uganda	  
	  
West	  Nile	  Bank	  Front	   1995-­‐2004	   	   Uganda	  
Djibouti	  
Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  the	  French	  Somalia	  Coast	   1977	   Africa	   multiple	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Egypt	  
Jordanian	  National	  Liberation	  Movement	   1972	   North	  Africa	   Jordan	  
	  
International	  Justice	  Group	   1995	   	   multiple	  
	   Takfir	  wa	  Jijra	   1972-­‐2011	   	   Multiple	  
	  
Islamic	  Liberation	  Organization	   1974-­‐1985	   	   Lebanon	  
Ethiopia	  
Oromo	  Liberaton	  Front	   1992-­‐2005	   Africa	   Multiple	  
France	   Action	  Directe	   1985	   Europe	   Germany	  
	   de	  Fes	   1994	   	   Morocco	  
	  
International	  Revolutionary	  Action	  Group	   1974-­‐1975	   	   Spain,	  Belgium	  
	  
New	  Armenian	  Resistance	   1977-­‐1983	   	   multiple	  
Georgia	  
Special	  Purpose	  Islamic	  Regiment	   1996-­‐2011	   Asia	   Russia	  
	  
Islamic	  International	  Peacekeeping	  Brigade	   1998-­‐2011	   	   Russia	  
Honduras	   Recontra	  380	   1993-­‐1997	   Latin	  America	   Nicaragua	  
India	   al-­‐Zulfikar	   1977-­‐1981	   Asia	   multiple	  
	  
Communist	  Party	  of	  Nepal-­‐Maoist	   1996-­‐2005	   	   Nepal	  
Iran	  
Movement	  of	  Islamic	  Action	  of	  Iraq	   1982	   Middle	  East	   France	  
	  
Guardsmen	  of	  Islam	   1980-­‐1984	   	   multiple	  
	  
Islamic	  Action	  Organization	   1980-­‐2003	   	   Iraq	  
	  
Group	  of	  the	  Martyrs	  Mostafa	  Sadeki	  and	  Ali	  Zadeh	  	   1992-­‐1993	   	   Switzerland	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Iraq	  
Iraqi	  Liberation	  Army	   1981	   Middle	  East	   Lebanon	  
	  
al-­‐Bara	  bin	  Malek	  Brigades	   2005	   	   Jordan	  
	   Mujahedin-­‐e-­‐Khalq	   1963-­‐2001	   	   Iran	  
	   Mujahedin-­‐e-­‐Khalq	   1971-­‐2011	   	   multiple	  
	  
Patriotic	  Union	  of	  Kurdistan	   1975-­‐2003	   	   Turkey	  
	  
May	  15	  Organization	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine	   1979-­‐1984	   	   multiple	  
	  
Kurdistan	  Freedom	  Hawks	   2004-­‐2011	   	   Turkey,	  Iran	  
Ireland	  
Irish	  Republican	  Army	   1955-­‐2001	   Europe	   UK	  
	   Official	  IRA	   1969-­‐1972	   	   UK	  
	   Irish	  National	  Liberation	  Army	   1974-­‐2011	   	   UK	  
	   Real	  IRA	   1998-­‐2011	   	   UK	  
Italy	   New	  Armenian	  Resistance	   1977-­‐1983	   Europe	   multiple	  
Japan	  
World	  United	  Formosans	  for	  Independence	   1970	   Asia	   U.S.	  
	   Japanese	  Red	  Army	   1970-­‐1987	   	   multiple	  
Jordan	   al-­‐Fatah	  Uprising	   1982-­‐1990	   Middle	  East	   Israel,	  Spain	  
	  
Battalion	  of	  the	  Matyr	  Abdullah	  Azzam	   2004-­‐2011	   	   Egypt	  
Krgystan	  
East	  Turkistan	  Liberation	  Organization	   1999	   Asia	   China	  
Lebanon	  
Armenian	  Red	  Army	   1982	   Middle	  East	   Netherlands	  
	   Green	  Cells	   1987	   	   Switzerland	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  Years	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Libya	  
Popular	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine	   1968-­‐2011	   	   multiple	  
	   Black	  September	   1971-­‐1988	   	   multiple	  
	  
Justice	  Commandos	  for	  the	  Armenian	  Genocide	   1975-­‐1983	   	   U.s.	  
	  
Armenian	  Secret	  Army	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Armenia	   1975-­‐1997	   	   multiple	  
	   Amal	   1975-­‐2008	   	   Israel	  
	   Hezbollah	   1982-­‐2011	   	   Multiple	  
	  
United	  Nasserite	  Organization	   1986-­‐1987	   	   Cyprus	  
	  
Anti-­‐Imperialist	  International	  Brigade	   1986-­‐1988	   	   Multiple	  
	   Islamic	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine	   1986-­‐1990	   	   Israel	  
	   al-­‐Zulfikar	   1977-­‐1981	   North	  Africa	   multiple	  
	  
Arab	  Commando	  Cells	   1986-­‐1988	   	   Lebanon	  
	  
Yemen	  Islamic	  Jihad	   1992-­‐2001	   	   multiple	  
Malaysia	   Sri	  Nakharo	   2001	   Asia	   Thailand	  
	  
Pattani	  United	  Liberation	  Organization	   1968-­‐2011	   	   Thailand	  
	  
Free	  Aceh	  Movement	   1977-­‐2005	   	   Indonesia	  
	   Jamaah	  Islamiya	   1978-­‐2005	   	   multiple	  
Mauritania	   Polisario	  Front	   1980-­‐2003	   North	  Africa	   Morocco	  
Myanmar	  
National	  Democratic	  Front	  of	  Bodoland	   1988-­‐2011	   Asia	   India	  
	  
Achik	  National	  Volunteer	  Council	   1995-­‐2004	   	   India	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   Region	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Nicaragua	  
Morazanist	  Front	  for	  the	  	  Liberation	  of	  Honduras	   1980-­‐1992	   Latin	  America	   Honduras	  
Nigeria	  
Movement	  for	  Democracy	  and	  Development	   1990-­‐2003	   Africa	   Chad	  
	  
Movement	  for	  Democracy	  and	  Development	   1990-­‐2003	   	   Chad	  
Pakistan	   Black	  December	   1973	   Middle	  East	   multiple	  
	   al-­‐Barq	   1978-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	  
Harakat	  ul-­‐Jihadi-­‐Islami	   1980-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	   Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	   1989-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	   Hizbul	  Mujahideen	   1989-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	  
Jamiat	  ul-­‐Mujahedin	   1990-­‐1996	   	   India	  
	  
Islami	  Inqilabi	  Mahaz	   1997-­‐2011	   	   India	  
	   al-­‐Badr	   1998-­‐2008	   	   India	  
	   al-­‐Madina	   2002-­‐2003	   	   India	  
Pakistan	   al-­‐Mansoorain	   2003-­‐2011	   	   India	  
Philipiines	  
Free	  Vietnam	  Revolutionary	  Group	   2001-­‐2011	   Asia	   multiple	  
Poland	  
Polish	  Revolutionary	  Home	  Army	   1982	   Europe	   Switzerland	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  
Abu	  Mus'ab	  al-­‐Zarqaqi	  Battalion	   2006	   Middle	  East	   Syria	  
Somalia	  
Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  the	  French	  Somalia	  Coast	   1975-­‐1977	   Africa	   Multiple	  
	  
Ogaden	  National	  Liberation	  Front	   1984-­‐2005	   	   multiple	  
	   al-­‐Ittihaad	  al-­‐Islami	   1992-­‐2005	   	   Ethiopia	  
	  
Oromo	  Liberaton	  Front	   1992-­‐2005	   	   Multiple	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   Target	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Spain	   Irrintzi	   2006	   Europe	   France	  
	  
Spanish	  Basque	  Battalion	   1975-­‐1981	   	   France	  
	  
Anti-­‐Terrorist	  Liberation	  Organization	   1983-­‐1987	   	   France	  
Sudan	  
Ummah	  Liberation	  Army	   1999	   Africa	   Somalia	  
	  
Eritrean	  Islamic	  Jihad	  Movement	   1980-­‐2011	   	   multiple	  
	  
Uganda	  Democratic	  Christian	  Army	   1990-­‐1994	   	   Uganda	  
	   Al-­‐Qaeda	   1992-­‐1996	   	   U.S.	  
	  
Lord's	  Resistance	  Army	   1994-­‐2011	   	   Uganda	  
Syria	  
Popular	  Front	  for	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Palestine	   1968-­‐2011	   Middle	  East	   Multiple	  
	  
Syrian	  Socialist	  Nationalist	  Party	   1979-­‐2008	   	   Lebanon	  
	  
Palestinian	  Popular	  Struggle	  Front	   1982-­‐1989	   	   multiple	  
	   al-­‐Fatah	  Uprising	   1983-­‐2011	   	   Israel,	  Spain	  
	  
Battalion	  of	  the	  Matyr	  Abdullah	  Azzam	   2004-­‐2011	   Middle	  East	   Egypt	  
Thailand	  
Karenni	  National	  Progressive	  Party	   1955-­‐2011	   Asia	   Myanmar	  
	  
All	  Burma	  Student's	  Democratic	  Front	   1988-­‐2011	   	   Myanmar	  
	  
Vigorous	  Burmese	  Student	  Warriors	   1999-­‐2011	   	   Myanmar	  
	  
Democratic	  Karen	  Buddhist	  Army	   2002-­‐2007	   	   Myanmar	  
Turkey	  
Iraqi	  Liberation	  Army	   1981	   Middle	  East	   Lebanon	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Turkey	  
Kurdistan	  Freedom	  Hawks	   2004-­‐2011	   	   Iran	  
U.S.	  
Hector	  Riobe	  Brigade	   1982-­‐1986	   North	  America	   Haiti	  
	  
Cambodian	  Freedom	  Fighters	   1998-­‐2001	   	   Cambodia	  
Yemen	  
Yemen	  Islamic	  Jihad	   1992-­‐2011	   Middle	  East	   multiple	  
	  
	  Table	  A.2:	  Collinearity	  	  
	  
Variable	   VIF	  
UCDP	   1.08	  
Contiguity	   1.04	  
State	  Capacity	   1.03	  
Real	  GDP	   1.32	  
OPEC	   1.03	  
Regime	  Type	   1.14	  
Freedom	   1.30	  
Pop.	  Total	   1.03	  
Pop.	  Growth	   1.27	  
ELF	   1.12	  
	  Control	  Variables	  	  
Regime	  Type	  was	  coded	  using	  the	  Polity	  IV	  score	  for	  regime	  type.	  A	  score	  for	  each	  state	  is	  provided	  based	  on	  a	  21-­‐point	  scale	  ranging	  from	  fully	  institutionalized	  autocracies	  (-­‐10)	  to	  fully	  institutionalized	  democracies	  (+10).	  State	  scores	  are	  based	  on	  qualities	  in	  executive	  recruitment,	  constraints	  on	  executive	  authority,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  political	  competition.	  As	  opposed	  to	  having	  a	  dichotomous,	  democracy	  variable,	  the	  Polity	  score	  for	  each	  state	  was	  included	  so	  as	  to	  capture	  the	  effects	  of	  moving	  from	  autocratic	  to	  democratic	  regimes.	  	  
	  	  	  61	  	  
Population	  and	  Population	  Growth	  variables	  were	  created	  from	  the	  demographic	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  Database,	  World	  Development	  Indicators.	  	  
OPEC	  is	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  coded	  1	  if	  a	  state	  is	  a	  member	  of	  OPEC	  in	  a	  given	  year	  and	  0	  otherwise	  is	  included	  as	  a	  control	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